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ABSTRACT
Firms spend billions of dollars each year advertising consumer products in order to influence
demand. Much of these outlays are on the creative design of advertising content. Creative
content often uses nuances of presentation and framing that have large effects on consumer
decision making in laboratory studies. But there is little field evidence on the effect of
advertising content as it compares in magnitude to the effect of price. We analyze a direct mail
field experiment in South Africa implemented by a consumer lender that randomized creative
content and loan price simultaneously. We find that content has significant effects on demand.
There is also some evidence that the magnitude of content sensitivity is large relative to price
sensitivity. However, it was difficult to predict which particular types of content would
significantly impact demand. This fits with a central premise of psychology— context matters—
and highlights the importance of testing the robustness of laboratory findings in the field.
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I. Introduction
Firms spend billions of dollars each year advertising consumer products in order to influence
demand. Economic theories of advertising often emphasize the role of informational content.
Stigler (1987, p. 243), for example, writes that “advertising may be defined as the provision of
information about the availability and quality of a commodity.” But advertisers spend resources
on other components of content which do not appear to be informative in the Stiglerian sense.1
While laboratory studies in marketing have shown that non-informative, persuasive content
may affect demand, there is little systematic evidence on the magnitude of these effects in the
field. Instead existing field research has focused on advertising exposure and intensity, rather than
on content: only 5 of the 232 empirical papers cited in Bagwell’s (2007) extensive review of the
economics of advertising address advertising content effects. Bagwell’s review covers both
laboratory and field studies and cites only one randomized field experiment.2 Chandy et al (2001)
review evidence of advertisement effects on consumer behavior, and find “research to date can be
broadly classified into two streams: laboratory studies of the effects of ad cues on cognition,
affect or intentions and econometric observational field studies of the effects of advertising
intensity on purchase behavior… each has focused on different variables and operated largely in
isolation of the other” (p. 399).3 Hence, while sophisticated firms use randomized experiments to
optimize their advertising content strategy (Stone and Jacobs 2001; Day 2003; Agarwal and
Ambrose 2007), academic researchers have rarely used field experiments to study content effects.
This dearth of field evidence on advertising content effects is striking given that the psychology
and behavioral economics literature is full of lab and field evidence suggesting that frames and
cues can affect consumer decisions.4
A particularly important gap is the lack of evidence on the magnitude of content effects
relative to price. This comparison can be accomplished by simultaneously varying content and
price in the same setting. A large marketing literature using conjoint analysis does this
comparison, but is focused on controlled laboratory settings. Likewise, the existing field evidence
on the effects of framing and cues does not simultaneously vary price.
1

E.g., see Mullainathan, Schwartzstein and Shleifer (forthcoming) for evidence on the prevalence of
persuasive content in mutual fund advertisements.
2
Krishnamurthi and Raj (1985) estimate how the intensity of advertising exposure affects the price
sensitivity of self-reported demand of an unnamed consumer product, using a split-cable TV experiment.
3
Simester (2004) laments the “striking absence” of randomized field experimentation in the marketing
literature. Several other articles in the marketing literature call for greater reliance on field studies more
generally: Stewart (1992), Wells (1993), Cook and Kover (1997), and Winer (1999). Similarly, in
economics Levitt and List (2007) discuss the importance of validating lab findings in the field.
4
See DellaVigna (2007) for a review of the field evidence and particularly influential laboratory studies.
He does not cite any studies on advertising other than an earlier version of our paper.
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Our study fills these gaps by analyzing a field experiment in South Africa. A subprime
consumer lender randomized both the advertising content and interest rate in actual direct mail
offers to 53,000 former clients (Figures 1-5 show example mailers).5 This design enables us to
estimate demand sensitivity to advertising content and compare it directly to price sensitivity. The
variation in advertising content comes from eight randomized creative “features” that varied the
presentation of the loan offer. We worked together with the Lender to design the features with
reference to the extensive literature (primarily from laboratory experiments in psychology and
decision sciences) on how “frames” and “cues” may affect choices. Mailers randomly varied in
whether they included: a photograph on the letter, reference to the interest rate as special or low,
suggestions for how to use the loan proceeds, a large or small table of example loans, inclusion of
the interest rate as well as the monthly payments, a comparison to a competitors’ interest rate,
mention of speaking the local African language, and mention of a promotional raffle prize for a
cell phone.
Joint F-tests across all eight content randomizations identify whether advertising content
affects demand. We find significant effects on loan take-up (the extensive margin) but not on loan
amount (the intensive margin). We do not find any evidence that the extensive margin demand
increase is driven by reductions in the likelihood of borrowing from other lenders. Nor do we find
evidence of adverse selection on the demand response to advertising content: repayment default is
not significantly correlated with advertising content.
The experimental design also allows us to estimate how much marketing content influences
behavior relative to the magnitude of the price effect. As one would expect, demand is
significantly decreasing in price; e.g., each 100 basis point (13%) reduction in the interest rate
increased loan take-up by 0.3 percentage points (4%). A few of the marketing content effects are
large relative to this price effect. For example, showing a single example loan (instead of four
example loans) had the same estimated effect as a 200 basis point reduction in the interest rate.
We also use F-tests to bound the magnitude of the joint effect of the eight content treatments on
loan takeup. We do this by identifying the smallest and largest absolute values that cannot be
rejected under a null hypothesis. This exercise produces a wide range of content effect sizes that
range from very small to very large relative to the price effect.
Overall then we find some evidence that advertising content affects consumer demand, and
some evidence that these effects can be large relative to price effects.
We suggest that advertising content effects in our context operate through persuasion rather
than information. Information-based explanations of our findings are challenged by two factors:
5

Customer and employee contact names are suppressed in these examples to preserve confidentiality.
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(i) the sample population consists of customers with substantial prior and recent experience with
the Lender, and (ii) the results suggest that some particularly effective content treatments provide
less information (by displaying fewer example loan calculations or suggested loan uses).
Our estimated magnitudes are particularly interesting in light of the interpretation that
advertising content can be persuasive. These magnitudes suggest that traditional demand
estimation which focuses on price (without observing the persuasive content) may produce
unstable estimates of demand. A related sobering finding is that we generally failed to predict
(based on the prior laboratory evidence) which particular types of advertising content would
significantly impact demand. One interpretation of this failure is that we lacked the statistical
power to identify anything other than economically large effects of any single content treatment.
Another interpretation fits with a central premise of psychology— context matters— and
highlights the importance of testing the robustness of laboratory findings in the field.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II describes the market and our cooperating Lender.
Section III details the experimental and empirical strategy. Section IV provides a conceptual
framework for interpreting the results. Section V presents the empirical results. Section VI
concludes.
II. The Market Setting
A. Overview
Our cooperating consumer Lender operated for over 20 years as one of the largest, most
profitable lenders in South Africa.6 The Lender competed in a “cash loan” market segment that
offers small, high-interest, short-term, uncollateralized credit with fixed monthly repayment
schedules to the working poor population. Aggregate outstanding loans in the cash loan market
segment equal about 38 percent of non-mortgage consumer debt.7 Estimates of the proportion of
the South African working-age population currently borrowing in the cash loan market range
from below 5 percent to around 10 percent.8

6

The Lender was merged into a bank holding company in 2005 and no longer exists as a distinct entity.
Cash loan disbursements totaled approximately 2.6% of all household consumption and 4% of all
household debt outstanding in 2005. (Sources: reports by the Department of Trade and Industry, Micro
Finance Regulatory Council, and South African Reserve Bank).
8
Sources: reports by Finscope South Africa, and the Micro Finance Regulatory Council. We were unable
to find data on the income or consumption of a representative sample of cash loan borrowers in the
population. We do observe income in our sample of cash loan borrowers; if our borrowers are
representative then cash loan borrowers account for about 11% of aggregate annual income in South
Africa.
7
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B. Additional Details on Market Participants, Products, and Regulation
Cash loan borrowers generally lack the credit history and/or collateralizable wealth needed to
borrow from traditional institutional sources such as commercial banks. Data on how borrowers
use the loans is scarce, since lenders usually follow the “no questions asked” policy common to
consumption loan markets. The available data suggest a range of consumption smoothing and
investment uses, including food, clothing, transportation, education, housing, and paying off other
debt.9
Cash loan sizes tend to be small relative to the fixed costs of underwriting and monitoring
them, but substantial relative to a typical borrower’s income. For example, the Lender’s median
loan size of 1000 Rand ($150) was 32 percent of its median borrower’s gross monthly income
(US$1 ~=7 Rand during our experiment). Cash lenders focusing on the highest-risk market
segment typically make one-month maturity loans at 30 percent interest per month. Informal
sector moneylenders charge 30-100 percent per month. Lenders targeting lower risk segments
charge as little as 3 percent per month, and offer longer maturities (12+ months).10
Our cooperating Lender’s product offerings were somewhat differentiated from competitors.
It had a “medium-maturity” product niche, with a 90 percent concentration of 4-month loans
(Table 1), and longer loan terms of 6, 12 and 18 months available to long-term clients with good
repayment records.11 Most other cash lenders focus on 1-month or 12+-month loans. The
Lender’s standard 4-month rates, absent this experiment, ranged from 7.75 percent to 11.75
percent per month depending on assessed credit risk, with 75 percent of clients in the high risk
(11.75 percent) category. These are “add-on” rates, where interest is charged upfront over the
original principal balance, rather than over the declining balance. The implied annual percentage
rate (APR) of the modal loan is about 200 percent. The Lender did not pursue collection or
collateralization strategies such as direct debit from paychecks, or physically keeping bank books

9

Sources: data of questionable quality from this experiment (from a survey administered to a sample of
borrowers following finalization of the loan contract); household survey data from other studies on
different samples of cash loan market borrowers (FinScope 2004; Karlan and Zinman 2008).
10
There is essentially no difference between these nominal rates and corresponding real rates. For instance,
South African inflation was 10.2% per year from March 2002-2003, and 0.4% per year from March 2003March 2004.
11
Market research conducted by the Lender, where employees or contractors posing as prospective
applicants collected information from potential competitors on the range of loan terms offered, confirmed
this niche. These exercises turned up only one other firm offering a “medium-maturity” at a comparable
price (3-month at 10.19%), and this firm (unlike our Lender) required documentation of a bank account.
ECI Africa and IRIS (2005) finds a lack of competition in the cash loan market. We have some credit
bureau data on individual borrowing from other formal sector lenders (to go along with our administrative
data on borrowing from the Lender) that we consider below.
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and ATM cards of clients, as is the policy of some other lenders in this market. The Lender’s
pricing was transparent, with no surcharges, application fees, or insurance premiums.
Per standard practice in the cash loan market, the Lender’s underwriting and transactions
were almost always conducted in person, in one of over 100 branches. Its risk assessment
technology combined centralized credit scoring with decentralized loan officer discretion.
Rejection was common for new applicants (50 percent) but less so for clients who had repaid
successfully in the past (14 percent). Reasons for rejection include inability to document steady
wage employment, suspicion of fraud, credit rating, and excessive debt burden.
Borrowers had several incentives to repay despite facing high interest rates. Carrots included
decreasing prices and increasing future loan sizes following good repayment behavior. Sticks
included reporting to credit bureaus, frequent phone calls from collection agents, court summons,
and wage garnishments. Repeat borrowers had default rates of about 15 percent, and first-time
borrowers defaulted twice as often.
Policymakers and regulators encouraged the development of the cash loan market as a less
expensive substitute for traditional “informal sector” moneylenders. Since deregulation of the
usury ceiling in 1992 cash lenders have been regulated by the Micro Finance Regulatory Council
(MFRC).12 Regulation required that monthly repayment could not exceed a certain proportion of
monthly income, but no interest rate ceilings existed at the time of this experiment.

III. Experimental Design, Implementation, and Empirical Strategy
A. Overview
We identify and price the effects of advertising content using randomly and independently
assigned variation in the description and price of loan offers presented in direct mailers.13
The Lender sent direct mail solicitations to 53,194 former clients offering each a new loan at
a randomly assigned interest rate. The offers were presented with variations on eight randomly
assigned advertising content “creative features” detailed below and summarized in Table 2. These
features varied only the presentation of the offer, not its economic content (i.e., not the cost,
amount or maturity of available credit).

12

The “traditional” microfinance approach of delivering credit to targeted groups, often using group
liability and not-for-profit mechanisms, is not prevalent in South Africa (Porteous 2003). But the industrial
organization of microcredit is trending steadily in the direction of the for-profit, more competitive delivery
of individual credit that characterizes the cash loan market (Robinson 2001). This push is happening both
from the bottom-up (non-profits converting to for-profits) as well as from the top-down (for-profits
expanding into traditional microcredit segments).
13
Mail delivery is generally reliable and quick in South Africa. Two percent of the mailers in our sample
frame were returned as undeliverable.
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B. Identification and Power
We estimate the impact of creative features on client choice using empirical tests of the following
form:
(1) Yi = f(ri, ci1, ci2, … ci13, di, Xi)
where Y is a measure of client i’s loan demand or repayment behavior, r is the client’s randomly
assigned interest rate, and c1…. c13 are categorical variables in the vector Ci of randomly assigned
variations on the eight different creative features displayed (or not) on the client’s mailer (we
need 13 categorical variables to capture the eight features because several of the features were
categorical, not binary). Most interest rate offers were discounted relative to standard rates, and
hence clients were given a randomly assigned deadline di for taking up the offer. All
randomizations were assigned independently, and hence are orthogonal to each other by
construction, after controlling for the vector of randomization conditions Xi.
We ignore interaction terms given that we did not have any strong priors on the existence or
magnitude of interaction effects across treatments. In the sub-sections E-G below we motivate
and detail our treatment design and priors on the main effects.
Our inference is based on several different statistics obtained from estimating equation (1).
Let βr be the probit marginal effect or OLS coefficient for r, and β1…. β13 be the marginal effects
or OLS coefficients on the creative variables from the same specification. We estimate whether
creative affects demand by testing whether the βn’s are jointly different from zero. We estimate
the magnitude of creative content effects in two ways. First we scale each βn by the price effect
βr. One can also scale the overall content vector effect, βC, by the price effect after calculating
the lower and upper bounds of the range of absolute values for which the joint F-test fails to reject
with a p-value of 0.10.
Our sample of 53,194 offers was constrained by the size of the Lender’s pool of former
clients and is sufficient to identify only economically large effects of individual pieces of creative
content on demand. To see this, note that each 100 basis point reduction in r (which represents a
13% reduction relative to the sample mean interest rate of 793 basis points) increased the client’s
application likelihood by 3/10 of a percentage point. The Lender’s standard take-up rate
following mailers to inactive former clients was 0.07. Standard power calculations show that
identifying a content feature effect that was equivalent to the effect of a 100 basis point price
reduction (i.e., that increased take-up from 0.07 to 0.073) would require over 300,000
observations. So in fact we can only distinguish individual content effects from zero if they are

7

equivalent to a price reduction of 200 to 300 basis points (i.e., to a price reduction of 25% to
38%).

C. Sample Frame Characteristics
The sample frame consisted entirely of experienced clients. Each of the 53,194 solicited clients
had borrowed from the Lender within 24 months of the mailing date, but not within the previous
6 months.14 The mean (median) number of prior loans from the Lender was 4 (3). The mean and
median time elapsed since the most recent loan from the Lender was 10 months. Table 1 presents
additional descriptive statistics on the sample frame.
These clients had received mail and advertising solicitations from the Lender in the past. The
Lender sent monthly statements to clients and periodic reminder letters to former clients who had
not borrowed recently. But prior to our experiment none of the solicitations had varied interest
rates or systematically varied creative content.

D. Measuring Demand and Other Outcomes
Clients revealed their demand with their take-up decision; i.e., by whether they applied before
their deadline at their local branch. Loan applications were assessed and processed using the
Lender’s normal procedures. Clients were not required to bring the mailer with them when
applying, and branch personnel were trained and monitored to ignore the mailers. To facilitate
this, each client’s randomly assigned interest rate was hard-coded ex-ante into the computer
system the Lender used to process applications.
Alternative measures of demand include obtaining a loan and the amount borrowed. The
solicitations were “pre-approved” based on the client’s prior record with the Lender, and hence
87% of applications resulted in a loan.15 Rejections were due to changes in work status, ease of
contact, or other indebtedness. The client also chose a loan amount and maturity (4, 6, or 12
months) subject to the maximums offered by the branch manager. The maximums were
orthogonal to the interest rate and content randomizations by construction, as branch personnel
were instructed to ignore the mailer and underwrite maximum allowable debt service with respect
to the standard interest rate schedule for a client’s risk category.

14

This sample is slightly smaller than the samples analyzed in two companion papers because a subset of
mailers did not include the advertising content treatments. See Appendix 1 of Karlan and Zinman
(forthcoming) for details.
15
All approved clients actually took a loan; this is not surprising given the short application process (45
minutes or less), the favorable interest rates offered in the experiment (see III-E for details), and the clients’
prior experience and hence familiarity with the Lender.
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We consider two other outcomes. We measure outside borrowing, using credit bureau data.
We also examine loan repayment behavior by setting Y = 1 if the account was in default (i.e., in
collection or had been charged off as of the latest date for which had repayment data), and = 0
otherwise. The motivating question is whether any demand response to creative content produces
adverse selection by attracting clients who are induced to take a loan they cannot afford. Note that
we have less power for this than for our demand estimations, since we only observe repayment
behavior for the 4,000 or so individuals that obtained a loan.

E. Interest Rate Variation
The interest rate randomization was stratified by the client’s pre-approved risk category because
risk determined the loan price under standard operations. The standard schedule for four-month
loans was: low-risk = 7.75 percent per month; medium-risk = 9.75 percent; high-risk = 11.75
percent. The randomization program established a target distribution of interest rates for 4-month
loans in each risk category and then randomly assigned each individual to a rate based on the
target distribution for her category.16,17 Rates varied from 3.25 percent per month to 11.75 percent
per month, and the target distribution varied slightly across two “waves” (bunched for operational
reasons) mailed September 29-30 and October 29-31, 2003. At the Lender’s request, 97 percent
of the offers were at lower-than-standard rates, with an average discount of 3.1 percentage points
on the monthly rate (the average rate on prior loans was 11.0 percent). The remaining offers in
this sample were at the standard rates.

F. Mailer Design
Figures 1-5 show example mailers. The Lender designed the mailers in consultation with both its
marketing consulting firm and us. As noted above the Lender had mailed solicitations to former

16

Rates on other maturities in these data were set with a fixed spread from the offer rate conditional on
risk, so we focus exclusively on the 4-month rate.
17
Actually three rates were assigned to each client, an “offer rate” (r) included in the direct mail
solicitation and noted above, a “contract rate” (rc) that was weakly less than the offer rate and revealed only
after the borrower had accepted the solicitation and applied for a loan, and a dynamic repayment incentive
(D) that extended preferential contract rates for up to one year, conditional on good repayment
performance, and was revealed only after all other loan terms had been finalized. This multi-tiered interest
rate randomization was designed to identify specific information asymmetries (Karlan and Zinman 2007).
40% of clients received rc < r, and 47% obtained D=1. Since D and the contract rate were surprises to the
client, and hence did not affect the decision to borrow, we exclude them from most analysis in this paper
and restrict the loan size sample frame to the 31,231 clients who were assigned r = rc for expositional
clarity. In principle rc and D might affect the intensive margin of borrowing, but in practice adding these
interest rates to our loan size demand specifications does not change the results. Mechanically what
happened was that very few clients changed their loan amounts after learning that rc < r.
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clients in the past but had never offered discounted interest rates or systematically experimented
with creative content.

i. Basic Content
Each mailer contained some boilerplate content; e.g., the Lender’s logo, its slogan “the trusted
way to borrow cash”, instructions for how to apply, and branch hours. Other pieces of boilerplate
content are closely related to specific creative treatments and described below.

ii. Creative Treatments: Content, Motivation, and Priors
Each mailer also contained mail merge fields that were populated (or could be left blank in some
cases) with randomized variations on eight different creative features. Some randomizations were
conditional on pre-approved characteristics and each of these conditions is included in the
empirical models we estimate.
The content and variations for each of the creative features are summarized in Table 2. We
detail the features below along with the prior work and hypotheses underlying these treatments.
Our motivation stems primarily from the psychology literature related to persuasive
communication. We discuss alternative interpretations of creative content effects in Section IV.
Feature 1: Photo. As the example mailers show, 80% of the mailers featured a photo of a
smiling person in the bottom right-hand corner. There was one photo subject for each
combination of gender and race represented in our sample (for a total of 8 different photos in
all).18 All subjects were deemed attractive and professional-looking by the marketing firm. The
overall target frequency for each photo was determined by the racial and gender composition of
the sample and the objective of obtaining: a 2-to-1 ratio of photo race that matched the client’s
race, a 1-1 ratio of photo gender that matches the client’s gender.19
The motivation for experimenting with photos starts with casual empiricism noting the
prevalence of attractive females in ads. A large psychology literature on affective (as opposed to
deliberative) decision making provides an indirect explanation for this stylized fact. Affective and

18

For mailers with a photo, the employee named at the bottom of the mailer was that of an actual employee
of the same race and gender featured in the photo. In cases where no employee in the client’s branch had
the matched race and gender, an employee from the regional office was listed instead.
19
If the client was assigned randomly to "match," then the race of the client matched that of the model on
the photograph. For those assigned to mismatch, we randomly selected one of the other races. In order to
determine a client's race, we used the race most commonly associated with his/her last name (as determined
by employees of the Lender). The gender of the photo was then randomized unconditionally at the
individual level.

10

often sub-conscious responses to stimuli drive decisions in many contexts; see, e.g., Slovic et al
(2002) for a review. The most closely related study shows that randomly manipulated background
images affect hypothetical student choices in a simulated Internet shopping environment (Mandel
and Johnson 2002).
Consequently our priors were: showing a photo of an attractive person would (weakly)
increase take-up vs. no photo, and showing a female photo would (weakly) increase take-up vs. a
male photo (Landry, Lange, List, Price and Rupp 2006).
The motivation for experimenting with matched and mismatched photos comes from the
psychology literature on communication and persuasion. Several studies suggest that
demographic similarity between client and salesperson can drive choice (Evans 1963), and that
similarity can outweigh expertise or credibility (Lord 1997; Cialdini 2001; Mobius and Rosenblat
2006).
Consequently we predicted that photos matched on race or gender would have (weakly) more
positive effects on takeup than photos that were mismatched.
Feature 2: Language Affinity
For another “similarity” treatment, we inserted a blurb “We speak (client’s language)” for a
random subset of the clients who were not primarily English speakers (44% of the sample).
When present, the matched language blurb was directly under the “business hours” box in the
upper right of the mailer. The rest of the mailer was always in English.
As with the matched photos we predicted that mentioning this type of similarity would
(weakly) increase take-up. The Lender was particularly confident that this treatment would
increase take-up and insisted that most eligible clients get it, hence the 63-37 split noted in Table
2.
Feature 3: “Special” rate vs. “Low” rate vs. no blurb
As discussed above, nearly all of the interest rate offers were at discounted rates, and the Lender
had never offered anything other than its standard rates prior to the experiment. So the Lender
decided to highlight the unusual nature of the promotion for a random subset of the clients: 50%
of clients received the blurb: “A special rate for you”, and 25% of clients received “A low rate for
you”. The mail merge field was left blank for the remaining clients. When present the blurb was
inserted just below the field for the language match.
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Our prior was that this treatment would not influence take-up, although there may be models
with very boundedly rational consumers and credible signaling by firms where showing one of
these blurbs would (weakly) increase take-up.
Feature 4: Suggested Uses
After the salutation and deadline, the mailer said something about how the client could use the
loan. This “suggested use” appeared in boldface type and took one of five variations on: "You can
use this loan to X, or for anything else you want". X was one of four common uses for cash loans
indicated by market research and detailed in Table 2. The most general phrase simply stated:
"You can use this cash for anything you want." Each of the five variations was randomly assigned
with equal probabilities.
A priori we thought the impact of this treatment was ambiguous. On one hand, suggesting
particular uses might make consumption salient and serve as a cue to take-up the loan. On the
other hand suggesting a particular use might create dissonance with the Lender’s “no questions
asked” policy regarding loan uses, a policy designed to counteract stigma associated with highinterest borrowing. Note that it is unlikely that suggesting a particular use provided information
by (incorrectly) signaling a policy change regarding loan uses, since each variation ended with:
“or for anything else you want.”
Feature 5: Number of Example Loans
The middle of a mailer prominently featured a table that was randomly assigned to display one or
four example loans. Each example showed a loan amount and maturity based on the client’s most
recent loan, and a monthly payment based on the randomly assigned interest rate.20 The rate itself
was also displayed in randomly chosen mailers (see Feature 6). Every mailer stated “Loans
available in other amounts….” directly below the example(s) table.
Our motivation for experimenting with a small vs. large table of loans comes from
psychology and marketing papers on “choice overload.” In strict neoclassical models demand is
(weakly) increasing in the number of choices. In contrast the choice overload literature has found
that demand can decrease with menu size. Large menus can “demotivate” choice by creating
feelings of conflict and indecision that lead to procrastination or total inaction (Shafir, Simonson
and Tversky 1993). Overload effects have been found in field settings including physician
20

High risk clients were not eligible for 6- or 12-month loans and hence their 4-example table featured 4
loan amounts based on small increments above the client’s last loan amount. When the client was eligible
for longer maturities we randomly assigned whether the 4-example table featured different maturities. See
Table 2 and Karlan and Zinman (forthcoming) for additional details.
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prescriptions (Redelmeier and Shafir 1995) and 401k plans (Iyengar, Huberman and Jiang 2004).
An influential field experiment shows that grocery store shoppers who stopped to taste jam were
much more likely to purchase if there were 6 choices rather than 24 (Iyengar and Lepper 2000).
We sought to test for choice overload in our setting by ensuring that each table contained an
example loan based on the randomly assigned interest rate and the client’s most recent maturity
and loan amount obtained from the Lender; i.e., the example loan presented in our small-table
condition was nested in the larger-table condition. So under most models of consumer choice the
small table provides less information than the larger table, and finding that mailers with a small
table have higher take-up rates is evidence of a choice overload effect. We discuss an alternative
interpretation based on signaling in Section IV.
Feature 6: Interest Rate Shown in Example(s)?
Tables also randomly varied whether the interest rate was shown.21 In cases where the interest
rate was suppressed the information presented in the table (loan amount, maturity, and monthly
payment) was sufficient for the client to impute the rate. This point was emphasized with the
statement below the table that: “There are no hidden costs. What you see is what you pay.”
Displaying the interest rate has ambiguous effects on demand in rich models of consumer
choice. Displaying the rate may depress demand by overloading bounded rational consumers (see
Feature 5), or by de-biasing consumers who tend to underestimate rates when inferring them from
other loan terms (Stango and Zinman 2007). Displaying the rate may have no effect if consumers
do not understand interest rates and use decision rules based on other loan terms (this was the
Lender’s prior). Finally, displaying the rate may induce demand by signaling that the Lender
indeed has “no hidden costs”, and/or by reducing computational burden.
Given the Lender’s prior that interest rate disclosure would not affect demand, and its
branding strategy as a “trusted” source for cash, it decided to err on the side of full disclosure and
the mailers displayed the interest rate with 80% probability. Given the Lender’s prior and the
potential for offsetting effects, our prior was that disclosure would have no effect on consumer
choice in this setting.
Feature 7: Comparison to Outside Rate
Randomly chosen mailers included a comparison of the offered interest rate to a higher outside
market rate. When included the comparison appeared in boldface in the field below “Loans
available in other amounts….” Half of the comparisons used a “gain frame”; e.g., "If you borrow
21

South African law did not require interest rate disclosure, in contrast to the U.S. Truth-in-Lending Act.
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from us, you will pay R100 Rand less each month on a four month loan." Half of the comparisons
used a “loss frame”; e.g., "If you borrow elsewhere, you will pay R100 Rand more each month on
a four month loan."22
Several papers have found that such frames can influence choice by manipulating “reference
points” that enter decision rules or preferences. There is some evidence that the presence of a
dominated alternative can induce choice of the dominating option (Huber, Payne and Puto 1982;
Doyle, O'Connor, Reynolds and Bottomley 1999). This suggests that mailers with our dominated
comparison rate should produce (weakly) higher take-up rates than mailers without mention of a
competitor’s rate. Invoking potential losses may be a particularly powerful stimulus for demand if
it triggers loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1991), and indeed
Ganzach and Karsahi (1995) find that a loss-framed message induced significantly higher credit
card usage than a gain-framed message in an direct marketing field experiment in Israel. This
suggests the loss-framed comparison should produce (weakly) higher take-up rates than either the
gain-frame or the no comparison conditions.
Feature 8: Cell Phone Raffle
Many firms, including the Lender and many of its competitors, use promotional giveaways as part
of their marketing. Our experiment randomized whether a cell phone raffle was prominently
featured in the bottom right margin of the mailer: "WIN 10 CELLPHONES UP FOR GRABS
EACH MONTH!" Per common practice in the cash loan market, the mailers did not detail the
odds of winning or the value of the prizes.
In fact the expected value of the raffle for any individual client was vanishingly small.23
Given that the cash loan market was imperfectly competitive (see Section II, and the modest
response to price reductions in Section V-A) this implies that the raffle should not change the
take-up decision based on strictly economic factors.24

22

The mailers also randomized the unit of comparison (Rand per month, Rand per loan, percentage point
differential per month, percentage point differential per loan), but the resulting cell sizes are too small to
statistically distinguish any differential effects of units on demand.
23
The 10 cell phones were each purchased for R300 and randomly assigned within the pool of
approximately 10,000 individuals who applied at the Lender’s branches during the 3 months spanned by
the experiment. The pool was much larger than the number of applicants who received a mailer featuring
the raffle, since by law all applicants (including first-time applicants, and former clients excluded from our
sample frame) were eligible for the raffle.
24
Omitting the raffle variable from our tests of the joint effect of the creative content variables has
negligible impacts on the F-statistics reported in Tables 3 and 4.
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Yet marketing practice suggests that promotional raffles may increase demand despite not
providing any material increase in the expected value of taking up the offer. A possible channel is
a tendency for individuals to over-estimate the frequency of small probability events,
In contrast several other papers have reached the surprising conclusion that promotional
giveaways can backfire and reduce demand. The channel seems to be that many consumers feel
the need to justify their choices and find it more difficult to do so when the core product comes
with an added option they do not value. This holds even when subjects understand that the added
option comes at no extra pecuniary or time cost (Simonson, Carmon and O'Curry 1994). And
there is no evidence that giveaways lead to inferences about the quality of the core product
(Shafir, Simonson and Tversky 1993).
Given the conflicting prior evidence we had no strong prior on whether and how promoting
the cell phone raffle would affect demand.

G. Deadlines
As noted above each mailer also contained a randomly assigned deadline by which the client had
to respond in order to obtain the offered interest rate. Deadlines ranged from “short”
(approximately 2 weeks) to “long” (approximately 6 weeks). Short deadlines were assigned only
among clients who lived in urban areas with a non-PO Box mailing address and hence were likely
to receive their mail quickly (see Table 2 for details). Some clients eligible for the short deadline
were randomly assigned a blurb showing a phone number to call for an extension (to the medium
deadline).
The deadline was randomized in order to create a somewhat low-powered test of
procrastination (or time management problems more generally). As discussed above regarding
choice overload, consumers may postpone difficult decisions or tasks. Indeed introspection and
the findings in Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) suggest that individuals often choose to impose
shorter deadlines on themselves even when longer ones are in the choice set. In contrast standard
models predict that consumers will always (weakly) prefer the longest available deadline, due to
the option value of waiting.
Thus a priori the impact of shorter deadlines on takeup seemed ambiguous.

IV. Conceptual Framework: Interpreting the Effects of Advertising Content
As discussed above the creative content treatments in our experiment were motivated primarily
by findings from psychology and marketing that are most closely related to persuasive theories of
advertising. Here we formalize definitions of persuasion and other mechanisms through which
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advertising content might affect consumer choice. We also speculate on the likely relevance of
these different mechanisms in our research context.
As a starting point consider a simple decision rule where consumers purchase a product if and
only if the marginal cost of the product is less than the expected marginal return (in utility terms)
of consuming the product. A very simple way to formalize this is to note that the consumer
purchases (loan) product (or consumption bundle) l iff:
(2) ui(l) – pi > 0
Where ui is the consumer’s (discounted) utility gain from purchasing l and p is the price.25
Advertising has no effect on either u or p and the model predicts that we will not reject the
hypothesis of null effects of creative content on demand when estimating equation (1).
One might wonder whether a very slightly enriched model would predict that consumers who
are just indifferent about borrowing (from the Lender) might be influenced by advertising content
(say by changing the decision rule from randomizing, to “go with the choice that has the
attractive mailer”.) This would be a more plausible interpretation in our setting if the
experiment’s pricing were more uniform and standard, given that everyone in the sample had
borrowed recently at the Lender’s standard rates. But experimental prices ranged widely, with a
density almost entirely below the standard rates. Thus if consumers were indifferent on average in
our sample then price reductions should have huge positive effects on take-up on average. This is
not the case; Section V-A shows that take-up elasticities for the price reductions are substantially
below one in absolute value.
Models in the “behavioral” decision making and economics of advertising literatures enrich
the simple decision rule in equation (2) and allow for the possibility that advertising affects
consumer behavior; i.e., for the possibility that average effect on the creative content variables in
equation (1) is different from 0. Following Bagwell’s (2007) taxonomy, we explore three distinct
mechanisms.
One possible mechanism is informative advertising content. Here the consumer has some
uncertainty about the utility gain and/or price (that could be resolved by a consumer at a search
and/or computational cost), and advertising operates on expectations about utility and price. Now
the consumer buys the product if:
(3) Eut(Cit)[ui(l)] –Ep(Cit)t[pi] > 0

25

In our context p is a summary statistic capturing the cost of borrowing. Without liquidity constraints the
discounted sum of any fees + the periodic interest rate captures this cost. Under liquidity constraints loan
maturity affects the effective price as well (Karlan and Zinman forthcoming).
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Where expectations E at time t are influenced by the vector of advertising content C that
consumer i receives.
In our setting, for example, announcing that the firm speaks Zulu might provide information.
The content treatments might also affect expected utility through credible signaling. Seeing a
photo on the mailer might increase the client’s expectation of an enjoyable encounter with an
attractive loan officer at the Lender’s branch.
Our experimental design does not formally rule out these sorts of informative effects, but we
do not find them especially plausible in this particular implementation. Recall that the mailers
were sent exclusively to clients who successfully repaid prior loans from the Lender. Most had
been to a branch within the past year and hence were familiar with the loan product, the
transaction process, the branch’s staff and general environment, and the fact that loan uses are
unrestricted.
A second possibility is that advertising is complementary to consumption: consumers have
fixed preferences, and advertising makes the consumer “believe—correctly or incorrectly—that it
[sic] gets a greater output of the commodity from a given input of the advertised product” (Stigler
and Becker 1977). In reduced form, this means that advertising affects net utility by interacting
with enjoyment of the product. So the consumer purchases if:
(4) ui(l, l*Ci) – pi > 0
Our design does not formally rule out complementary mechanisms, but their relevance might
be limited in our particular implementation. Complementary models tend to be motivated by
luxury or prestige goods (e.g., cool advertising content makes me enjoy wearing a Rolex more, all
else equal), and the product here is an intermediate good that is used most commonly to pay for
necessities. Moreover, the first-hand prior experience our sample frame had with consumer
borrowing makes it unlikely that marketing content would change perceptions of the loan product
in a complementary way.
Finally, a third mechanism is persuasive advertising content. A simple model of persuasion
would be that the true utility of purchase is given by: ui(l) – pi . But individuals decide to
purchase or not based on:
(5) Di(ui(l), Ci) – pi >0
where Di(ui(l), Ci) is the effective decision, rather than hedonic, utility. Persuasion can operate
directly on preferences by manipulating reference points, providing cues that increase the
marginal utility of consumption, providing motivation to make (rather than procrastinate) choices,
or simplifying the complexity of decision making. Other channels for persuasion arise if
perceptions of key decision parameters are biased and can be manipulated by advertising content.
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To clarify the distinction from the informative view, note that allowing for biased expectations or
biased perceptions of choice parameters is equivalent to allowing for a distinction between
hedonic utility (i.e., true, experienced utility) and choice utility (perceived/expected utility at the
time of the decision). Under a persuasive view of advertising, consumers decide based on choice
utility.
Notice that as in the traditional model, price will continue to affect overall demand. In this
sense, there may appear to be a stable demand curve. But the demand curve may shift as content
Ci varies. Thus demand estimation that ignores persuasive content may produce a misleading
view of underlying utility.

V. Results
This section presents results from estimating the equation (1) detailed in Section III-B.

A. Interest Rates
Recall that consumer sensitivity to the price of the loan offer will provide a useful way to scale
the magnitude of any advertising content effects. Table 3 shows the estimated magnitude of loan
demand price sensitivities in our sample.
Our main result on price is that the probability of applying rose 3/10 of a percentage point for
every 100 basis point reduction in the monthly interest rate (Column 1). This implies a 4%
increase in take-up for every 13% decrease in the interest rate, and a take-up price elasticity of 0.28.26 Column 2 shows a nearly identical result when the outcome is obtaining a loan instead of
applying for a loan. Column 3 shows that the total loan amount borrowed (unconditional on
borrowing) also responded negatively to price. The implied elasticity here is -0.34.27 Column 4
shows that default rose relatively strongly with price; this result indicates adverse selection and/or
moral hazard with respect to interest rates.28 Column 5 shows that more expensive offers did not
induce significantly more substitution to other formal sector lenders (as measured from credit
bureau data). This result is a precisely estimated zero relative to a sample mean outside borrowing
proportion of 0.22. The lack of substitution is consistent with the descriptive evidence discussed
in Section II on the dearth of close substitutes for the Lender.

26

Clients were far more elastic with respect to offers at rates greater than the Lender’s standard ones
(Karlan and Zinman forthcoming). This small sub-sample (632 offers) is excluded here because it was part
of a pilot wave of mailers that did not include the content randomizations.
27
See Karlan and Zinman (forthcoming) for additional results on price sensitivity on the intensive margin.
28
The finding here is reduced-form evidence of information asymmetries; see Karlan and Zinman (2007)
for additional results that separately identify adverse selection and moral hazard effects.
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B. Advertising Content Treatments
Table 3 also presents the results on creative content variations for the full sample.
The F-tests reported near the bottom of the table indicate whether the content features had an
effect on demand that was jointly significantly different from zero.29 The applied (or “take-up”)
model has a p-value of 0.07, and the “obtained a loan” model has a p-value of 0.04, implying that
advertising content did influence the extensive margin of loan demand with at least 90%
confidence. Column 3 shows that the joint effect of content on loan amount is insignificant (pvalue = 0.25). Column 4 shows an insignificant effect on default; i.e., we do not find evidence of
adverse selection on response to content. Column 5 shows an insignificant effect on outside
borrowing; i.e., the positive effect on demand for credit from the Lender in Columns 1 and 2 does
not appear to be driven by balance-shifting from other lenders.
Results on the individual content feature variable conditions provide some insight into how
much creative affects demand. For our preferred outcome (applied), the female photo, 1 example
table, and “no specific loan use mentioned” conditions have statistically significant effects. In
each case the implied magnitudes are large; each condition increases demand by at least as much
as a 200 basis point (25%) reduction in the interest rate. Note that some caution regarding
statistical inference is warranted here, since with 13 content variables we would expect one to be
significant purely by chance. The other notable finding here is the disjoint between our priors
and actual findings. Several treatments that we thought might have significant effects did not (cell
raffle, comparisons, client’s language, and no photo), and one condition we did not have strong
priors about (no suggested use) turned out to have a strong positive effect.
Another approach to estimating the magnitude of the advertising content effects is to identify
the lower and upper bounds for the range of values for which the F-test does not fail for all
creative content. The lower bound tells us the lowest absolute value for all creative coefficients
for which the F-test rejects the null hypothesis. For applied as an outcome, this is 0.0010, and for
take-up as an outcome, this is 0.0026. As with the point estimates on individual content variables,
these bounds can be scaled by the price coefficient to obtain estimates of the relative magnitude
of advertising content on loan demand. Thus, the lower bound “aggregate” content effect is one
third of the effect generated by a one percentage point change in the monthly interest rate. The
upper bounds, on the other hand, are very large, at 0.0448 and 0.0498, respectively. We only
calculate upper and lower bounds when the primary null hypothesis of no effect is rejected (and
hence we do not calculate bounds for content effects on loan size, outside borrowing, or default).
29

Results are nearly identical if we omit the raffle from the joint test of content effects on the grounds that
the raffle has some expected pecuniary value.
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C. Heterogeneity
Given our lack of strong priors on how any advertising content effects might vary with consumer
characteristics, and statistical power issues, we will not devote much space to discussing
heterogeneity in responses to advertising content.
For the interested reader, Table 4 presents results for sub-samples split by gender, education
(as predicted from occupation), number of prior loans with the Lender, and number of months
since prior loan with the Lender. There is some evidence that males respond more to creative
content (Columns 1 and 2). But we view these results as merely suggestive.

D. Deadlines
Recall that the mailers also included randomly assigned deadlines designed to test the relative
importance of option value (longer deadlines make the offer more valuable and induce take-up)
versus time management problems (longer deadlines induce procrastination and perhaps
forgetting, and depress takeup). Table 5 presents results from estimating our usual specification
with the deadline variables included.30
The results in Table 5 Panel A suggest that option value dominates any time management
problem in our context: take-up increased dramatically with deadline length. Lengthening the
deadline by approximately two weeks (i.e., moving from the omitted short deadline to the
extension option or medium deadline, or from medium to long) increases take-up by about three
percentage points. This is a large effect relative to the mean take-up rate of 0.085, and enormous
relative to the price effect. Shifting the deadline by two weeks had about the same effect as a
1,000 basis point reduction in the interest rate. This large effect could be due to time-varying
costs of getting to the branch (e.g., transportation cost, opportunity cost of missing work), and/or
to borrowing opportunities or needs that vary stochastically (e.g., bad shocks).
Some caveats are in order however. First, the strength of the longer-deadline effect may be
due in part to the nature of direct mail. We took precautions to ensure that the mailers arrived
well before the assigned deadline, but it may be the case that clients did not open the mailer until
after the deadline expired. E.g., if clients only opened their mail every two weeks, then the short
deadline would mechanically produce a very low takeup rate (in fact the mean rate for those
offered the short deadline was 0.057, vs. 0.085 for the full sample). Second, our deadline

30

We omit the creative content variables from the specification for expositional clarify in the table, but
recall that all randomizations were done independently. So including the full set of treatments does not
change the results.
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variation may miss important nonlinearities over longer horizons. Note however that longer
deadlines were arguably empirically irrelevant in our context, as the Lender deemed deadlines
beyond six weeks operationally impractical.
Panel B explores whether Panel A misses a smaller, offsetting procrastination effect. We do
this by testing whether shorter deadlines increase the likelihood of take-up after deadlines pass.
There is no support for this hypothesis.
In all the results suggest that deadlines may be very important determinants of consumer
choice and merit continued study.
VI. Conclusion
Theories of advertising, and laboratory studies on framing, cues, and product presentation,
suggest that advertising content can have important effect on consumer choice. Yet there is
remarkably little field evidence on how much, and what types, of advertising “creative” content
affect demand. We analyze a direct mail field experiment that simultaneously and independently
randomized the price and creative content of actual loan offers made to former clients of a
subprime consumer lender in South Africa. We find that advertising content had statistically
significant effects on take-up. There is some evidence that these content effects were
economically large relative to price effects. Consumer response to advertising content does not
seem to have been driven by substitution across lenders, and there is no evidence that it produced
adverse selection. Deadline length trumped both creative content and price in economic
importance. In all, the results suggest that advertising content and deadlines are important drivers
of consumer choice. Our design and results also leave many questions unanswered and suggest
directions for future research.
First, we found it difficult to predict ex-ante which types and variations of creative content
would affect demand. This fits with a central premise of psychology—context matters— and
suggests that pinning down the types and magnitude of content effects will require systematic
field experimentation on a broad scale. Also, studying the dynamics of consumer responses will
be particularly important given the opportunities for learning from repeated exposures to
advertising.
Another unresolved question is why creative content matters. In the taxonomy of the
economics of advertising literature, the question is whether content is informative,
complementary to preferences, and/or persuasive. We find the persuasive mechanism most
compelling in our context, given the nature of the product (an intermediate good) and the
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experience level of consumers in the sample. But this interpretation is speculative, since our
design is not sufficiently rich to identify mechanisms underlying the content effects.
Lastly, it will be fruitful to study consumer choice in conjunction with the strategies of firms
that provide and frame choice sets. A literature on industrial organization with “behavioral” or
“boundedly rational” consumers is just beginning to (re-)emerge (Ellison 2006; Gabaix and
Laibson 2006), and there should be gains from trade between this literature and related ones on
the economics of advertising and the psychology of consumer choice.
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Figure 3. Example Letter 3
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Figure 4. Example Letter 4
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Figure 5. Example Letter 5
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
Applied before deadline
Obtained a loan before deadline
Loan amount in Rand
Loan in default
Got outside loan and did not apply with Lender
Maturity = 4 months
Offer rate
Last loan amount in Rand

Full sample
0.085
0.074
110
(536)
0.22

7.93
1118
(829)
Last maturity = 4 months
0.93
Low risk
0.14
Medium risk
0.10
High risk
0.76
Female
0.48
Predicted education (years)
6.85
(3.25)
Number previous loans with Lender
4.14
(3.77)
Months since most recent loan with Lender
10.4
(6.80)
Race = African
0.85
Race = Indian
0.03
Race = White
0.08
Race = Mixed ("Coloured")
0.03
Gross monthly income in Rand
3416
(19657)
Number of observations
53194
Means or proportions, with standard deviations in parentheses.

Obtained a loan
1
1
1489
(1351)
0.12
0.00
0.81
7.23
1158
(835)
0.91
0.30
0.21
0.50
0.49
7.08
(3.30)
4.71
(4.09)
6.19
(5.81)
0.85
0.03
0.08
0.04
3424
(2134)
3944

Did Not Obtain a Loan
0.01
0
0
(0)
0.24
7.98
1115
(828)
0.93
0.12
0.10
0.78
0.48
6.83
(3.25)
4.10
(3.74)
10.8
(6.76)
0.85
0.03
0.08
0.03
3416
(20420)
49250
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Table 2. Experimental Summary
Creative Content
Feature 1: Photo

Feature 2: Client's Language
Feature 3: "A 'special' or 'low' rate for you"

Feature 4: Suggested Loan Uses

Feature 5: Number of Example Loans

No photo

Treatment Value

Black photo
Non-Black photo:
Indian
White
Coloured

0.13
0.12
0.07

Photo with race matched to client race
Photo with mismatched race

0.53
0.27

Female photo
Male photo

0.40
0.40

Photo with gender matched to client gender
Photo with mismatched gender
"We speak [client's language]"
No mention of language
Interest rate is labeled as:
"Special" or "Low"
No mention of "Special" or "Low"
"You can use this loan for anything you want"
"You can use this loan to X, or for anything else you want", where X is:
Pay off a more expensive debt
Buy an appliance
Pay for school
Repair your home
One loan amount shown in example table
Of low and medium risk clients
Of high risk clients

0.40
0.40
0.63
0.37

Four loan amounts shown in example table
Four loan amounts in table, one maturity (high risk clients)
Four loan amounts in table, one maturity (low/med risk clients)
Four loan amounts in table, three maturities (low/med risk clients)
Feature 6: Interest Rate Shown in Example(s)? Interest rate shown (and monthly payments)
Interest rate not shown (just monthly payments)
Feature 7: Comparison to Outside Rate
No comparison to competitor rates
Gain frame
Loss frame
Feature 8: Cell Phone Raffle
Mentioned cell phone raffle
Not mentioned cell phone raffle
Other Treatments
Interest Rate

Deadline

Frequency
0.20

Sample Frame/Conditions

0.48

0.75
0.25
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.43
0.15
0.52
0.57
0.48
0.75
0.10
0.80
0.20
0.20
0.40
0.40
0.25
0.75

High Risk: [3.25, 11.75]
Medium Risk: [3.25, 9.75]
Low Risk: [3.25, 7.75]
Medium deadline (approx 4 weeks)
Long deadline (approx 6 weeks)
Short deadline (approx 2 weeks)
Short deadline with option to extend 2 weeks by calling in

All

Assigned conditional on client's race to produce the targeted ratio of client-photo matches.

Eligible if non-English primary language (0.44 of full sample)
All
All

All

Only low and medium risk eligible for 4 amount, 3 maturity treatment
All
All
All

Monthly rates randomly assigned from a smooth distribution, conditional on risk
0.78
0.14
0.03
0.04

1.0 of sample eligible for medium
0.79 of sample eligible for long (certain branches excluded by Lender)
0.14 of sample eligible for short (certain branches excluded by Lender, and all PO Boxes excluded)
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Table 3. Effects of Advertising Content on Borrower Behavior: Full Sample
OLS, Probit
1 = Loan in
collection
status
Probit
(4)
0.003**
(0.001)
0.001
(0.009)
-0.011**
(0.006)
-0.002
(0.006)
0.013
(0.010)
-0.008
(0.009)
-0.001
(0.008)
-0.002
(0.007)
0.001
(0.007)
-0.003
(0.006)
-0.003
(0.007)
-0.006
(0.007)
0.010
(0.006)
0.010
(0.007)
0.0626
3944
0.2873

Borrowed from
Applied
Obtained Loan Loan amount
other Lender
Probit
Probit
OLS
Probit
(1)
(2)
(3)
(5)
Offer interest rate
-0.003***
-0.003***
-4.771***
0.001
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.824)
(0.001)
1= no photo
0.001
0.003
3.932
-0.002
(0.004)
(0.004)
(7.676)
(0.006)
1= female photo
0.006**
0.006**
8.329
-0.005
(0.003)
(0.002)
(5.090)
(0.004)
1= photo gender matches client’s
-0.003
-0.003
-7.177
0.004
(0.003)
(0.002)
(5.085)
(0.004)
1= black photo
0.006
0.003
-3.762
0.001
(0.005)
(0.004)
(10.628)
(0.007)
1= photo race matches borrower’s
-0.006
-0.003
9.064
-0.002
(0.005)
(0.004)
(10.408)
(0.007)
1 = we speak (your language)
-0.004
-0.004
-11.356*
0.013**
(0.004)
(0.003)
(6.293)
(0.006)
1 = a ‘low’ or 'special' rate for you
0.000
0.001
3.386
-0.000
(0.003)
(0.003)
(5.921)
(0.005)
1 = no specific loan use mentioned
0.006**
0.004
4.085
-0.003
(0.003)
(0.003)
(5.627)
(0.004)
1 = one example loan
0.007**
0.008***
2.439
-0.004
(0.003)
(0.003)
(4.838)
(0.004)
1 = interest rate shown
0.002
0.004
2.888
0.001
(0.003)
(0.003)
(6.723)
(0.005)
1= no comparison to competitor rate
0.003
0.001
-0.490
-0.008*
(0.003)
(0.003)
(6.460)
(0.005)
1= gain frame comparison to competitor rate
0.002
0.002
-3.092
-0.003
(0.003)
(0.002)
(5.068)
(0.004)
1 = cell phone raffle mentioned
-0.002
-0.001
-9.438*
-0.001
(0.003)
(0.002)
(5.120)
(0.004)
(pseudo-) R-squared
0.0456
0.0534
0.0361
0.0048
N
53194
53194
53194
53194
p-value F-test on all advertising content variables
0.0729
0.0431
0.2483
0.4866
Absolute value of lower bound of range for which F-test rejects null
0.0010
0.0026
0.0448
0.0498
Absolute value of upper bound of range for which F-test fails to reject null
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Huber-White standard errors. Probit results are marginal effects. All models include controls for randomization conditions:
risk, race, gender, language, and mailer wave (September or October).
LHS:
Specification:
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Table 4. Effects of Advertising Content on Likelihood of Applying: Heterogeneity
Probit
LHS: Applied
Applied
Applied
Applied
Applied

Sample Frame:
Offer interest rate
1= no photo
1= female photo
1= photo gender matches client’s
1= black photo

Males
(1)
-0.002***
(3.484)
0.003
(0.590)
0.008**
(2.285)

Females
(2)
-0.003***
(4.361)
0.002
(0.388)
0.003
(0.829)

Applied

Applied
Last Loan
High
Low
>10
Predicted Predicted Prior Loans Prior Loans Months
Education Education
>3
<=3
Prior
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
-0.004*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004***
(4.344)
(3.554)
(4.622)
(3.051)
(4.026)
-0.006
0.006
0.000
0.003
0.008
(0.912)
(1.208)
(0.037)
(0.454)
(1.189)
0.004
0.007**
0.004
0.007*
0.009**
(0.818)
(2.183)
(1.341)
(1.755)
(2.085)
-0.003
-0.002
0.000
-0.007
-0.001
(0.671)
(0.562)
(0.107)
(1.633)
(0.343)
0.006
0.004
0.002
0.014*
0.001
(0.900)
(0.624)
(0.298)
(1.646)
(0.128)
-0.013*
-0.000
-0.001
-0.014
0.003
(1.804)
(0.064)
(0.267)
(1.621)
(0.436)
-0.008
-0.002
-0.006
-0.000
-0.004
(1.206)
(0.554)
(1.430)
(0.029)
(0.677)
0.006
-0.004
0.001
-0.003
0.003
(1.214)
(1.093)
(0.391)
(0.472)
(0.524)
0.004
0.007*
0.008**
0.003
0.010**
(0.931)
(1.831)
(2.151)
(0.647)
(2.059)
0.006
0.007**
0.005
0.009*
0.010**
(1.245)
(2.162)
(1.629)
(1.879)
(2.176)
-0.000
0.004
0.001
0.004
0.001
(0.074)
(1.064)
(0.291)
(0.889)
(0.164)
0.008
-0.001
0.004
0.001
0.002
(1.449)
(0.187)
(0.984)
(0.119)
(0.355)
0.004
0.001
0.003
0.002
0.001
(1.026)
(0.377)
(0.916)
(0.404)
(0.307)
-0.007
0.000
-0.000
-0.005
-0.004
(1.552)
(0.147)
(0.075)
(1.210)
(0.828)
0.050
0.043
0.032
0.056
0.026
20809
32385
30766
22428
28264
0.3090
0.2002
0.2747
0.4512
0.2716

Applied
Last Loan
<=10
Months
Prior
(8)
-0.002***
(3.839)
-0.005
(1.254)
0.002
(0.712)
-0.004
(1.373)
0.009*
(1.836)
-0.013***
(2.615)
-0.004
(0.981)
-0.003
(0.924)
0.003
(0.866)
0.004
(1.313)
0.004
(1.203)
0.003
(0.766)
0.004
(1.273)
-0.001
(0.181)
0.006
24923
0.2327

-0.000
0.012*
(0.034)
(1.727)
1= photo race matches borrower’s
-0.001
-0.010
(0.211)
(1.419)
1 = we speak (your language)
-0.002
-0.007
(0.334)
(1.357)
1 = a ‘low’ or 'special' rate for you
-0.002
0.003
(0.530)
(0.598)
1 = no specific loan use mentioned
0.008**
0.003
(2.146)
(0.724)
1 = one example loan
0.010***
0.003
(2.662)
(0.776)
1 = interest rate shown
-0.002
0.007
(0.404)
(1.604)
1= no comparison to competitor rate
0.003
0.002
(0.718)
(0.411)
1= gain frame comparison to competitor rate
0.002
0.003
(0.525)
(0.764)
1 = cell phone raffle mentioned
-0.000
-0.005
(0.034)
(1.247)
Pseudo R-squared
0.048
0.044
N
27848
25346
p-value F-test on all advertising content variables
0.0623
0.5354
Absolute value of lower bound of range for which F-test rejects null
0.0021
Absolute value of upper bound of range for which F-test fails to reject null
0.0388
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Probit marginal effects with Huber-White standard errors. All models include controls for randomization conditions: risk, race, gender (columns
3-8 only), language and mailer wave (September or October).
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Table 5. Effects of Deadline on Borrower Behavior
Probit, OLS
Panel A: Pre-Deadline Demand

Applied
(1)
-0.003***
(0.001)
0.032***
(0.012)
0.030***
(0.007)
0.060***
(0.012)
0.0461
0.0000
53194

Obtained
Loan
(2)
-0.003***
(0.000)
0.024**
(0.011)
0.027***
(0.006)
0.056***
(0.011)
0.0538
0.0000
53194

Loan
amount
(3)
-4.777***
(0.824)
31.132*
(17.286)
38.034***
(13.823)
70.112***
(15.095)
0.0351
0.0000
53194

after short
LHS= Applied deadline
(1)
Offer interest rate
-0.001
(0.001)
Short deadline, extended
-0.022*
(0.012)
Medium deadline
-0.006
(0.011)
Long deadline
-0.009
(0.011)
Pseudo r-squared
0.0560
F-test of joint significance of all deadlines
0.2518
N
53194

after
medium
deadline
(2)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.005
(0.011)
-0.004
(0.010)
0.002
(0.011)
0.0448
0.6332
53194

after long
deadline
(3)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.003
(0.010)
-0.005
(0.009)
-0.001
(0.010)
0.0369
0.8262
53194

LHS:
Offer interest rate
Short deadline, extended
Medium deadline
Long deadline
Adjusted r-squared (or pseudo)
F-test of joint significance of all deadlines
N
Panel B: Post-Deadline Applications

1 = Loan in Borrowed
collection from other
status
Lender
(4)
(5)
0.008***
0.001
(0.002)
(0.001)
0.024
-0.010
(0.042)
(0.013)
0.021
-0.007
(0.030)
(0.012)
0.014
-0.005
(0.036)
(0.012)
0.0597
0.0007
0.8487
0.8813
3944
53194

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Huber-White standard errors. Probit results are marginal effects. All models
include controls for randomization conditions: risk, mailer wave (September or October), and deadline eligibility.
Short deadline is the omitted category; "short deadline, extended" gave customers a number to call and get an
extension (to the medium deadline).
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